



In 1989, mounting losses at weak and failing
thrifts (at the rate of $1 billion per month)
shocked the public and led to passage of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in August 1989. (The
Letters of December 1, 1989, and January 19,
1990, discuss provisions of FIRREA.)
This legislation sought chiefly to resolve the
immediate crisis of insolvent thrifts, and did not
address its root causes. Unfortunately, however,
FIRREA may prove insufficient even to take care
of the immediate problems at all the troubled
and failing institutions. Estimates ofthe total cost
of the bailout now run as high $500 billion.
Clearly, more needs to be done to resolve these
problems. However, it is equally important that
the root causes also be addressed. If substantial
changes in the deposit insurance system are not
made, the current bankruptcy crisis may be re-
peated some time in the future.
To contribute to the debate concerning the best
way to reform the deposit insurance system, this
Letter briefly describes a variety of proposals and
then offers one that has not received much atten-
tion, namely, that government-sponsored insur-
ance be replaced by a mutual insurance program
in which banks and thrifts would monitor each
other's loans and investments and guarantee
each other's deposits.
The current environment
Deposit insurance protects depositors' funds in
the event the depository institution fails. How-
ever, the very fact that deposit insurance protects
depositors means that the threat of deposit with-
drawals no longer exercises discipline on the
managers of banks and thrifts.
In theory, uninsured liability holders still provide
market discipline since the government explicitly
insures bank and thrift deposits only up to
$100,000. In practice, however, the federal
deposit insurance funds generally have extended
insurance protection to all deposits and even to
non-deposit liabilities. For example, in bank fail-
ures resolved through purchases and assump-
tions, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) generally has reimbursed most liability
holders, including depositors whose accounts
exceed the $100,000 limit. Moreover, in a recent
decision, the FDIC agreed to insure pension fund
deposits totaling tens and hundreds of millions of
dollars by construing the $100,000 limit to apply
to each individual beneficiary ofthe pension
fund, not to each bank account.
The lack of market discipline poses a particularly
serious problem in the case of institutions with
low or negative net worth. These institutions have
a clear incentive to undertake risky investments
since their owners enjoy the benefits when the
investments do well, and yet bear little or none
of the costs when the investments fail. This
"heads-I-win, tails-the-taxpayer-Ioses" implica-
tion of government-sponsored deposit insurance
has played a major role in generating the current
crisis, particularly since the personal liability of
bank and thrift owners is legally limited to the
value of their investment.
Given these incentives, the deposit insurance
system can serve the interests of both depositors
and taxpayers only if regulators are able and will-
ing to shut down institutions before the net worth
in those institutions actually turns negative.
The recent thrift crisis suggests that prompt
closure of financially weak institutions cannot be
taken for granted. In certain instances, political
considerations prevented prompt intervention.
Unforeseeable events like the collapse of the
oil economy in Texas, which bankrupted
many thrifts, played apart. The thrift regulators
also have been critically understaffed. Finally,
the limited resources of the thrift insurance fund
itself curtailed the ability of regulators to act
promptly. Accordingly, the thrift regulators wereFRBSF
poorly equipped to intervene as promptly as
would have been required to safeguard the
public interest.
Reform proposals
The fact that resolving the thrift crisis comes
with such a high price tag does not mean that
government-sponsored deposit insurance can
never work without imposing a substantial bur-
den on taxpayers. Capital requirements already
have been raised, giving regulators more time to
shut down capital-deficient institutions before
they become insolvent. Greater use of (unin-
sured) debt also has been advocated as a way to
insulate the insurance funds and, hence, the tax-
payer from underperforming assets. Both of these
changes diminish the incentive to take excessive
risks. However, these reforms can be effective
only if accompanied by vigorous regulatory and
enforcement efforts. Even then, however, success
would not be guaranteed, so it is worthwhile to
consider other proposals.
The most drastic proposal is to do away with
deposit insurance altogether. This measure would
protect taxpayers, but would necessitate that de-
positors assume the risk of loss and monitor the
solvency ofthe thrift or bank they choose as a
repository for their savings. At first glance, it ap-
pears that requiring depositors to monitor deposi-
tory institutions is inefficient because it would
entail much duplication of effort. However,
monitoring the financial condition of publicly-
held thrifts and banks probably would not be
particularly burdensome since information on the
condition of these institutions is readily available
and, presumably, is captured in share prices.
Thus, the monitoring effort may involve little
more than checking stock prices for abnormal
drops. Many worry, however, that eliminating
deposit insurance may reintroduce the problem
of destabilizing runs on institutions. In any event,
such a proposal probably is not feasible from a
political standpoint.
Another proposed change would be to enforce
the $100,000 limit on deposit insurance by re-
quiring the FDIC to dispose offailed institutions
in such a way that uninsured liability holders do
not receive de facto protection. Some have even
advocated reducing the de jure limit to $25,000
or $10,000, and have suggested that the limit be
applied to each person rather than to each ac-
count held by a given person at different institu-
tions. Advocates of this change contend that
small depositors would remain protected, while
large depositors, being uninsured, would have an
incentive to monitor the riskiness of institutions.
The prospect of withdrawals by large depositors
would, it is argued, provide the discipline on
managers needed to prevent the abuses seen in
the recent thrift crisis. Ultimately, such a pro-
posal will be effective only if the regulators take
prompt action against all failing institutions,
regardless of size.
A third possibility is to replace government
deposit insurance with private insurance. Profit-
maximizing insurance companies have strong in-
centives to monitor thrift and bank investments.
Moreover, private insurers have considerable lev-
erage to enforce desired changes on the part of
bank and thrift management since they can term-
inate insurance coverage more promptly than a
government insurer can.
However, private insurance is not without
shortcomings. For example, the experience with
medical insurance, where the insurer can moni-
tor and discipline the practices of doctors and
hospitals only with great difficulty, indicates that
cost containment might pose serious problems.
Mutual insurance
A fourth possibility is to institute a system under
which thrifts and banks collectively insure them-
selves. Mutual insurance differs from govern-
ment-sponsored insurance in that the insured
institutions themselves bear primary respon-
Sibility for monitoring capital adequacy. Deposi-
tors at failed institutions would be reimbursed
from funds supplied through premiums paid by
the member firms. In the event of widespread
failures, additional assessments would supple-
ment these funds to guarantee the adequacy of
the reserves.
The attractiveness of mutual insurance stems
from the fact that the depository institutions
themselves are better equipped than anyone
to detect and evaluate the extent of problems
at their sister institutions. Further, they have
the incentive to act promptly since the solvent
institutions are ultimately responsible for the
insolvent ones. Moreover, the fact that managers
of thrifts have been far more successful in acting
in the interest of thrift owners than regulators of
thrifts have been in safeguarding the publicinterest argues in favor of mutual deposit insur-
ance over government-sponsored insurance.
But mutual insurance can succeed only if the
insuring group has the power to terminate the
insurance coverage of those institutions experi-
encing difficulties. In other words, solvent insti-
tutions must be able to shut down insolvent
ones. There is a clear potential for abuse here,
since solvent thrifts and banks have an incentive
to eliminate competitors whether insolvent or
not.
Also, legal difficulties may need to be overcome.
Insolvent thrifts and banks should not be able to
use the legal process to block termination of cov-
erage, nor should they be allowed to engage in
time-consuming appeals which impose long
delays in the closure process.
To see whether mutual insurance might be
workable, it is useful to look at the experiences
of banks in the states that adopted mutual insur-
ance plans prior to the establishment offederal
deposit insurance. The experience with these
plans is not uniformly favorable. For example, a
study by Charles Calomiris provides some evi-
dence that insured banks used the insurance
protection to expand at unrealistically rapid rates
during peak periods of prosperity, and subse-
quently experienced high failure rates when the
prosperity ended. This apparent tendency to
encourage excessive expansion was, of course,
exactly the problem with government-insured
thrifts in the decade just ended.
However, most of these state mutual insurance
plans are not directly comparable to the kind of
plans proposed today, and a comparison of the
failure rates of institutions that participated in
these mutual insurance programs with those that
did not participate is highly misleading. First,
these state plans were not nationwide in scope,
implying insufficient risk-pooling, particularly in
undiversified agricultural states. Second, many
state plans were voluntary and allowed banks to
exit at their own discretion. In a voluntary sys-
tem, only the weakest banks tended to remain
when problems arose since these were the ones
with the most to gain from continued partici-
pation.
Also, the banks that participated voluntarily
in these mutual insurance schemes had little
incentive to force changes in the risk-taking
behavior of the other members of the pool since
the option of withdrawing generally was availa-
ble to the solvent institutions. Indeed, several
voluntary mutual insurance plans ended because
the solvent members withdrew, and this led to
losses for (supposedly) insured depositors. These
problems with state mutual insurance plans are
easily overcome by making mutual insurance
mandatory.
Others have suggested that the experience with
branch banking prior to the introduction of fed-
eral deposit insurance provides useful evidence
on the potential benefits of mutual insurance.
They argue that mutual insurance is similar to
a bank with geographically-dispersed branches
since both diversify risks and pool capital over a
broad geographic area. In view of this similarity,
they suggest that the lower failure rates of banks
in states in which branch banking was permitted
relative to those in unit banking states implies
that mutual insurance would be an effective
means of protecting depositors and controlling
risk. During the banking panics that preceded
the Civil \/'Jar, for example, branch banks in sev-
eral southern states experienced lower failure
rates than did unit banks. Also, in the depressed
economic conditions prevailing in agricultural
states in the 1920s and 1930s, branch banks had
lower failure rates and lower loss rates for de-
positors than did unit banks.
In sum, the evidence regarding the practicability
of mutual insurance is not extensive, but it is suf-
ficiently encouraging to warrant a closer look at
this proposal. The problems involved in setting
up a mutual insurance system, although not
minor, seem less onerous than those created by
the current deposit insurance system. Although it
is not obvious that mutual insurance is the best
alternative to the present system, it is one of the
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